Abstract This study reports the recent trends in the occurrence of methicillinresistant Staphylococcus aureus in Finland, with special focus on characterization of the strains linked to interhospital epidemics and local outbreaks. Between 1981 and 1997, the annual number of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus isolations ranged from 89 to 272. Of all blood isolates of Staphylococcus aureus reported to the National Infectious Disease Register during the period 1995-97 (np2049), only six were resistant to methicillin. Between 1992 and 1997, typing analysis by various methods (i.e., antibiogram, phage typing, ribotyping, and pulsed-field gel electrophoresis) identified 18 different strains capable of causing intrahospital outbreaks or interhospital epidemics. These 18 strains were separated into 13 different ribotypes and 14 major pulsed-field gel electrophoresis types. Multiresistance was investigated as a possible marker for epidemicity. Eight of the ten interhospitally spread strains were multiresistant compared to only three of the eight intrahospitally spread outbreak strains. More than one-third of the epidemic and local outbreak strains were suspected to be of foreign origin. The majority (6 of 10) of the epidemics were localized in southern and western Finland, and the largest epidemic, which occurred in the Helsinki metropolitan area, involved over 200 persons. Thus far, the epidemics have remained primarily intracity problems, and only two strains have become endemic.
Introduction
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) has become a major problem in many hospitals worldwide [1, 2] . The prevalence of MRSA in hospitals in the USA increased from 2.4% in 1975 to 35% in 1996 [3, 4] . Similar trends have also been reported in European countries; Italy reported an increase from 6% in 1981 to 26% in 1986 and Germany an increase from 1.7% in 1990 to 8.7% in 1995 [5, 6] . However, some other countries have succeeded in controlling MRSA. The prevalence of MRSA in the Netherlands has leveled off [7] , and Denmark has even reported a decline [8] . As a whole, the situation has been better in Scandinavia than in southern Europe [2] .
The increase in MRSA prevalence may result from the spread of individual strains. In some countries, MRSA strains have spread from one hospital to another, which has led to a nationwide problem [5, 9, 10] . Certain MRSA strains have even been shown to spread between continents [11] . Furthermore, the eradication of endemic MRSA strains, the presence of which results from a long-term increase in MRSA numbers, has proved difficult [12, 13] .
In recent years, several genotypic typing methods have been developed for the characterization of MRSA strains. Of these, one of the best for epidemiological investigation is pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . However, a combination of different typing methods is often needed to obtain a reliable analysis of strains that are suspected to be epidemiologically related.
In the present study, we report the recent trends of the MRSA occurrences in Finland and describe the molecular characteristics of MRSA strains linked to local outbreaks in hospitals as well as to interhospital epidemics from 1992 to 1997. The strains were characterized with the help of antimicrobial susceptibility testing, phage typing, ribotyping, and PFGE.
Materials and Methods

Surveillance of Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus in
Finland. Before 1992, data on annual numbers of MRSA isolations was collected voluntarily on a weekly basis and was available only from the larger microbiology laboratories, which included those of all central and university hospitals as well as the larger private laboratories. Since 1992, all microbiology laboratories have been required to send MRSA isolates to the Staphylococcal Reference Laboratory at the National Public Health Institute (KTL) for further study. Since 1995, the laboratories have also been required to report MRSA isolations as well as all blood and cerebrospinal fluid findings of Staphylococcus aureus to the National Infectious Disease Register at the National Public Health Institute. In this register, the time interval within which Staphylococcus aureus isolations from the same person are interpreted as one case is 36 months. The following data concerning each isolation are reported to the register: age and gender of the patient, health care institution, date of isolation, and the source of positive culture.
Typing Scheme. All MRSA isolates submitted to the Staphylococcal Reference Laboratory were typed by phage and tested for antimicrobial susceptibility. Further studies using ribotyping and PFGE were performed if the isolates had any of the following criteria: (i) they were known to be linked to a suspected epidemic based on the background information obtained from the submitting hospital, (ii) they possessed an antimicrobial susceptibility pattern and a phage type similar to the strains identified earlier in the laboratory, and/or (iii) they could not be typed by phages.
Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing. The antimicrobial susceptibilities were tested after overnight growth at 37 7C on MuellerHinton agar plates by the disk diffusion method performed according to guidelines recommended by the National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards [23] . The antibiotics tested were mupirocin, erythromycin, clindamycin, gentamicin, tobramycin, chloramphenicol, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, tetracycline, rifampin, ciprofloxacin, and vancomycin (Oxoid, Sweden). Resistance to oxacillin was tested by disk diffusion after incubation at 30 7C for 24-48 h. Minimal inhibitory concentrations of oxacillin were determined by the E test according to the manufacturer's instructions (AB Biodisk, Sweden). In strains with lowlevel resistance to oxacillin (1-6 mg/ml), the presence of the mecA gene was detected by mecA polymerase chain reaction (PCR) as described previously [24] .
Phage Typing. Phage typing was performed with the universal set of phages [25] at 1! and 100! routine test dilutions. Phage typing was performed both with and without heat treatment of the bacteria [26] . The phage stock solutions were obtained from the Statens Serum Institut, Copenhagen, Denmark. A phage pattern was defined on the basis of the weakest test dilution that produced clear lytic reactions. The strains were divided into the following four groups according to the phage reactions recorded: group III phages (6, 42E, 47, 53, 54, 75, 77, 83A, 84, or 85); group III phages together with other phages; non-group III phages; and the nontypeable group.
Ribotyping. Genomic DNA was extracted as described previously [27] and digested separately with the restriction enzymes EcoRI, HindIII, and ClaI (Boehringer Mannheim, Germany) as recommended by the manufacturer. DNA fragments were separated by electrophoresis in 0.7% agarose gels at 20 V for 17-18 h, transferred to a nylon membrane (Boehringer Mannheim) by vacuum blotting, and hybridized with plasmid pKK3535 containing the rrn operon of Escherichia coli [28] according to the manufacturer's instructions. Digoxigenin labeling of pKK3535 and detection (DIG labeling and detection kit, Boehringer Mannheim) of the hybridized probe were performed according to the instructions. Digoxigenin-labeled DNA marker III (Boehringer Mannheim) and MluI-digested Citrobacter koseri 32 [29] were used as molecular weight standards. Ribopatterns were determined by visual comparison and given an arbitrary identification letter, an uppercase letter for HindIII, and lowercase letters for EcoRI and ClaI. A difference of one band in the ribopattern was considered to represent a new pattern. A ribotype was a combination of the ribopatterns achieved by all three restriction enzymes individually.
Pulsed-Field Gel Electrophoresis. PFGE analysis was performed as described by Goering and Duensing [30] and Patel et al. [31] with slight modifications. A 0.5 ml volume of log-phase cells was washed with TEN buffer (0.1 M Tris [pH 7.5], 0.15 M NaCl, 0.1 M EDTA) and suspended in 0.5 ml of TEN buffer. An equal volume of 2% Sea Plaque agarose (FMC BioProducts, USA) in TEN buffer was added, and the mixture was cast in block molds. Solidification took place for 15 min on ice. For each strain, six blocks were incubated at 37 7C for 3-18 h in 3 ml of EC buffer (6 mM Tris-HCl [pH 7.5], 1 M NaCl, 0.1 M EDTA, 0.5% Brij 58, 0.2% Na-deoxycholate, 0.5% sodium lauroyl sarcosine) containing lysostaphin (30 U/ml) (Sigma Chemical, Germany). The blocks were then transferred to 3 ml of ESP buffer (0.5 M EDTA [pH 9.5], 1% sodium lauroyl sarcosine) containing proteinase K (250 mg/ml) and incubated overnight at 56 7C. Next, they were washed at room temperature, once with 3 ml of TE buffer containing 100 ml of 100 mM phenylmethylsulfonyl fluoride and three times with plain TE buffer for 30-60 min each time. After 30 min of incubation in 200 ml of restriction buffer, a single agarose block was digested overnight with 10 U of SmaI (Boehringer Mannheim) in 100 ml of restriction buffer. The chromosomal fragments were separated with a Chef DR III (Bio-Rad, USA) for 24 h on 1% SeaKem agarose gel (FMC BioProducts) at 6 V/cm; the pulse times were increased linearly, with the initial switching time being 10 s and the final switching time being 60 s. A Lambda Ladder PFG marker (New England BioLabs, USA) was used as a molecular weight standard. The similarity of the PFGE patterns was assessed according to the guidelines of Tenover et al. [32] .
Strain Definitions. A sporadic strain of MRSA was defined as a strain isolated from one person only and displaying an individual antimicrobial susceptibility pattern and/or phage type. For nonphage typeable strains, the strain relatedness was ascertained by ribotyping and by PFGE. MRSA isolates sharing the same typing patterns and isolated from two or more persons in the same hospital were defined as being representative of a locally spread outbreak strain (OMRSA). MRSA isolates sharing the same typing patterns and isolated from two or more persons at two or more hospitals were defined as representatives of an epidemic MRSA strain (EMRSA).
Infection Control Measures.
In 1995 a group of experts produced national guidelines for the prevention of MRSA in Finland. These recommendations include protocols for rapid identification of MRSA, prevention of MRSA transmission, and treatment of MRSA infection and carriage, as well as for the actions to be undertaken when a new case of MRSA infection or carriage is recognized. For example, patients who have been hospitalized outside the Nordic countries are advised to be screened for MRSA carriage and treated in contact isolation until a negative culture result is obtained. The patient records of patients known to be colonized or infected with MRSA, should be labeled accordingly. In case of patient transfers, it is also recommended to inform the new health care facility about the MRSA status of the patient.
Results
Epidemiology of Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Isolations.
On the basis of the laboratory notifications received at the National Infectious Disease Register and data received from the major microbiology laboratories, the annual numbers of MRSA isolations range from 89 to 272 (Figure 1 ). Between 1995 and 1997, which is the period from which more detailed information is available, a total of 317 MRSA isolations were reported to the National Infectious Disease Register. Forty-eight percent of the notifications were received from health care institutions located within the Helsinki metropolitan area. In addition, the health care institutions of three other cities reported more than ten MRSA isolations each. The majority (51%) of the isolates were obtained from persons 60 years of age or older; 10% of the isolates were from children (~16 years). In most cases (95%) MRSA was isolated from a source other than blood, cerebrospinal fluid, or urine: only six of the isolates were recovered from blood. Staphylococcus aureus was isolated from blood a total of 2049 times. Of these isolations, the number of MRSA isolations was two in 1995, zero in 1996, and four in 1997, with the percentage of methicillin resistance being 0.3%, 0%, and 0.5%, respectively.
Identification of Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Strains.
During the period 1992-97, approximately 900 isolates sent to the Staphylococcal Reference Laboratory were confirmed as MRSA. Of these, 202 were regarded as sporadic isolates based on their unique antimicrobial susceptibility pattern and/or phage type. On the basis of further analysis by ribotyping and PFGE as well as epidemiological information received from the hospitals, 143 additional strains nontypeable by phage could be considered sporadic. Among the remaining 549 strains (61% of the total), the same phenotypic and molecular typing patterns were shared by at least two (2-200) other strains. These strains were classified as EMRSA or OMRSA (Table 1) in accordance with the definitions described above. Figure 2) . Clone F could be further divided into subclones (F2, F3, and F4), three of which (F, F2, and F4) were found among the EMRSA strains and one of which (F3) was found among the OMRSA strains. Likewise, one of the EMRSA strains was identified as clone N, whereas the subclone, N2, was an OMRSA strain. Other subtypelevel PFGE type variants (A2, A3, E2, and J2; see parentheses in Table 1 ) were found only among isolates from some long-lasting epidemics (E1, E5, and E13). PFGE was able to differentiate MRSA strains with identical ribotypes (Table 1) . Strains E13 and E14 as well as strains O11 and E12 were shown to be different from each other by PFGE. Similarly, strains E7, O8, and E10 were divided into subclones. Interestingly, the ribotypes of PFGE types F and N differed from those of F2, F3, F4 (ribopattern A:a:e vs. B:b:b), and N2 (AG:aa:r vs. BB:g:r). The ribotypes of PFGE subtypelevel variants observed during an epidemic remained constant.
Ribotyping of Outbreak
Phage Typing. Among the EMRSA and OMRSA strains, eight and seven different phage types, respectively, were found (data not shown). Of the ten EMRSA strains, three (E1, E6, and E13) reacted only with type III phages, three (E5, E10, and E12) reacted with other phages besides type III phages, three (E2, E7, and E14) remained nontypeable even after heat treatment, and one (E17) showed only non-group III reactions (Table 1) . Of the eight OMRSA strains, four (O3, O4, O8, and O18) showed group III reactions, two (O9 and O11) reacted with group III and other phages, and two (O15 and O16) showed non-group III reactions. When the heat treatment was used, three additional strains (E13, O16, and O18) were typeable. Antimicrobial Susceptibility. Eight of the ten EMRSA strains were multiresistant (resistant to 1 3 antibiotic groups other than beta-lactam agents). In contrast, only three (38%) of the OMRSA strains were multiresistant. All multiresistant EMRSA and OMRSA strains showed resistance to erythromycin, clindamycin, gentamicin, and tobramycin, but sensitivity to chloramphenicol, tetracycline, rifampicin, and ciprofloxacin varied. All but two of these strains were sensitive to trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole. Slight variations in the resistance patterns of isolates from the same epidemic were occasionally observed (data not shown).
Demographics of Epidemics Caused by MethicillinResistant Staphylococcus aureus.
Most interhospital epidemics and half of the local outbreaks occurred in the southern part of Finland, where one-quarter of all Finns live. The largest epidemic, caused by strain E1, occurred in the Helsinki metropolitan area and involved more than 200 persons, including patients and health care workers in more than ten hospitals ( Table 1 ). The outbreak started in 1992 and peaked in 1994, though the strain is still isolated occasionally. In addition, two smaller epidemics (caused by strains E2 and E5) occurred in the Helsinki metropolitan area, affecting 36 and 22 persons in four and eight hospitals, respectively. Two other major cities also encountered epidemics of similar size. One city, in western Finland, had two epidemics (caused by strains E6 and E7) that affected 35 and 57 persons in two and four health care facilities, respectively. Another city, in central Finland, experienced two epidemics (caused by strains E12 and E13), with 43 and 17 persons involved in four and six health care facilities, respectively.
Discussion
Our study shows no increase in the annual numbers of MRSA isolated in Finland during the 9-year period investigated. The proportion of methicillin resistance among Staphylococcus aureus strains causing invasive infections has also remained low. However, intensive typing performed between 1992 and 1997 revealed several strains that had caused local intrahospital outbreaks or interhospital epidemics. On most occasions, the spread of strains was successfully controlled and the emergence of MRSA endemicity avoided.
According to the weekly reports collected up to 1995 and the notifications submitted to the National Infectious Disease Register since 1995, the annual number of MRSA isolations in Finland has been relatively low. However, a reliable comparison with other countries is difficult, as proper denominator data, such as hospital admissions or patient-days, are rarely available and used in analyses. Some uncertainty also remains about the data collected prior to 1995, since the diagnostic criteria for detecting methicillin resistance and the guidelines for weekly reporting of MRSA were not well described. Thus, it remains uncertain whether all of the strains reported were indeed resistant to methicillin.
In Finland, the annual proportion of invasive MRSA isolates was extremely low (0-0.5%) compared to rates in other countries. In England and Wales, the proportion of invasive MRSA increased dramatically from 1.5% in 1989 to up to 31.7% in 1997 [33] . Compared to Finland, other countries also have higher figures: the proportion of invasive MRSA was 3.5% in three Canadian tertiary care hospitals during a 6-year period [34] , 46% in a hospital in Hong Kong during a period of 22 months [35] , 46% in a Spanish tertiary care university hospital during 4 years of an extensive outbreak of MRSA [36] , and 36% in another Spanish university hospital during a 23-month period [37] .
Despite the reasonably good situation on a national level in Finland, hospital outbreaks and epidemics caused by several different MRSA strains have occurred. More than half of the strains studied were capable of spreading from one person to another. By means of phage typing, antimicrobial susceptibility testing, ribotyping, and PFGE analysis, 18 different MRSA strains were identified as causative strains. Ten of these strains were categorized by their capability to cause epidemic interhospital spread (EMRSA) and eight by their capability to cause local outbreaks (OMRSA) in various geographic locations in Finland.
The dissemination of MRSA strains in Finland has, thus far, been mostly an intrahospital or an intracity problem. Unlike the situation in many other countries [9, 10, 21] , there is no single clone (or few clones) that has spread across the country. Although we were able to identify several clones capable of spreading, the strains that spread interhospitally usually remained within the same city. This may be attributable to the less frequent patient transfers between the cities located outside the Helsinki metropolitan area. Frequent patient transfers between hospitals have been suspected to provoke the spread of E1 MRSA in Helsinki. An analogous situation has been observed previously in Germany, where several epidemic clones could be traced to distinct regions of Germany. Subsequently, these clones disseminated throughout the country, mainly due to patient transfers between hospitals [6] .
To minimize the dissemination of MRSA in Finnish hospitals, national guidelines for MRSA prevention were established in 1995. In practice, the infection control methods differ slightly between various hospitals, and some hospitals may have been more successful in controlling MRSA than others. In seven epidemics/ outbreaks, the causative MRSA strains have been suspected to be of foreign origin, as the strain identified was first isolated from a patient who had recently been transferred from a hospital outside the Nordic countries. However, the actual figure may be higher, since information on patient transfers has not been collected systematically. Currently, it is recommended that all patients who have been hospitalized outside the Nordic countries be screened for MRSA upon hospital admission. According to the present study, endemic MRSA strains are not yet a major problem in Finland. However, of the ten Finnish MRSA strains showing epidemic spread, two are still isolated occasionally. These strains have persisted since the beginning of the 1990s, although their numbers are decreasing. Both of these strains have been found predominantly within the particular city affected. Periodic existence of dominant MRSA clones has been reported due to the overall decline in MRSA numbers [38] or due to substitution of the original clone by others [39] . In the UK, for instance, the strain that was prevalent in the 1980s, EMRSA-1, was followed by a series of EMRSA strains (EMRSA strains 2-14) by 1986. The EMRSA strains currently prevalent in the UK are EMRSA 3, 15, and 16 [40] [41] [42] [43] .
Genomic alterations among the epidemic MRSA isolates analyzed in this study were occasionally detected by the appearance of PFGE subtype variants of isolates belonging to the same epidemics. This may reflect the evolution of epidemic strains during the study period. Even more variation within the EMRSA strains could have been detected if all isolates had been routinely typed by PFGE. However, after the characteristics of a specific epidemic strain were established by all typing methods at the beginning of the epidemic, the subsequent isolates were usually identified on the basis of phage type and antibiogram alone. The current guidelines for interpreting PFGE patterns are restricted to outbreak investigations within a limited time frame [32] . In cases of long-lasting epidemics during which subtype variation of the causative strain is expected to occur, interpretation based on these guidelines may not be recommendable [44] .
In conclusion, the overall number of MRSA has remained relatively stable in Finland, and, thus far, no single clone has dominated or replaced others. The limited spread of MRSA is most probably due to successful preventive measures taken both nationally and locally. A crucial part of infection control is the exchange of information between hospitals. The emergence of endemic strains and the increasing numbers of patient transfers may, however, challenge the infection control at both local and national levels in the future.
